Findings for Container Security, High, [TheRedHatter/javagoof:Dockerfile]:Use of a Broken or Risky Cryptographic Algorithm
Created by: armorcodegithubpreprod[bot]
Findings for Container Security, High, [TheRedHatter/javagoof:Dockerfile]:Use of a Broken or Risky Cryptographic Algorithm
Component Details
- Exploit Maturity: no-known-exploit
- Vulnerable Package: -
- Current Version: -
- Vulnerable Version(s): ><3.3-1+deb9u1
- Vulnerable Path: >null
NVD Description
Note:
Versions mentioned in the description apply to the upstream nettle
package.
See How to fix?
for Debian:9
relevant versions.
A flaw was found in Nettle in versions before 3.7.2, where several Nettle signature verification functions (GOST DSA, EDDSA & ECDSA) result in the Elliptic Curve Cryptography point (ECC) multiply function being called with out-of-range scalers, possibly resulting in incorrect results. This flaw allows an attacker to force an invalid signature, causing an assertion failure or possible validation. The highest threat to this vulnerability is to confidentiality, integrity, as well as system availability.
References
Origin : null Type : null Image Id : null
Snyk Project Status: Active
Component Details
- Exploit Maturity: no-known-exploit
- Vulnerable Package: -
- Current Version: -
- Vulnerable Version(s): ><1.1.0k-1~deb9u1
- Vulnerable Path: >null
NVD Description
Note:
Versions mentioned in the description apply to the upstream openssl
package.
See How to fix?
for Debian:9
relevant versions.
ChaCha20-Poly1305 is an AEAD cipher, and requires a unique nonce input for every encryption operation. RFC 7539 specifies that the nonce value (IV) should be 96 bits (12 bytes). OpenSSL allows a variable nonce length and front pads the nonce with 0 bytes if it is less than 12 bytes. However it also incorrectly allows a nonce to be set of up to 16 bytes. In this case only the last 12 bytes are significant and any additional leading bytes are ignored. It is a requirement of using this cipher that nonce values are unique. Messages encrypted using a reused nonce value are susceptible to serious confidentiality and integrity attacks. If an application changes the default nonce length to be longer than 12 bytes and then makes a change to the leading bytes of the nonce expecting the new value to be a new unique nonce then such an application could inadvertently encrypt messages with a reused nonce. Additionally the ignored bytes in a long nonce are not covered by the integrity guarantee of this cipher. Any application that relies on the integrity of these ignored leading bytes of a long nonce may be further affected. Any OpenSSL internal use of this cipher, including in SSL/TLS, is safe because no such use sets such a long nonce value. However user applications that use this cipher directly and set a non-default nonce length to be longer than 12 bytes may be vulnerable. OpenSSL versions 1.1.1 and 1.1.0 are affected by this issue. Due to the limited scope of affected deployments this has been assessed as low severity and therefore we are not creating new releases at this time. Fixed in OpenSSL 1.1.1c (Affected 1.1.1-1.1.1b). Fixed in OpenSSL 1.1.0k (Affected 1.1.0-1.1.0j).
References
- BUGTRAQ
- CONFIRM
- CONFIRM
- CVE Details
- DEBIAN
- Debian Security Tracker
- FEDORA
- FEDORA
- MISC
- MISC
- N/A
- OpenSSL Security Advisory
- REDHAT
- SUSE
- Ubuntu CVE Tracker
Origin : null Type : null Image Id : null
Snyk Project Status: Active